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Abstract 
The standard tax competition literature predicts a race to the bottom in capital tax rates as capital 
mobility increases. Recently, the very different modeling framework of the new economic geography 
literature has produced the contrasting result that economic integration leads to agglomeration 
rents to capital which can be taxed away, in turn lea ding to higher corporate taxation. This paper 
incorporates increasing returns directly into the standard tax competition modeling framework to 
identify the origin of this disparity of results. The model illustrates that increasing returns reduce 
traditional tax competition pressures as capital mobility increases, and that changes in preferences 
for the public good, combined with increasing cross-border ownership of capital, and thus tax 
exporting incentives, are the main factors driving tax rates higher. Tax exporting has not previously 
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Abstract: The standard tax competition literature predicts a race to the bottom in capital tax rates 
as capital mobility increases. Recently, the very different modeling framework of the new 
economic geography literature has produced the contrasting result that economic integration leads 
to agglomeration rents to capital which can be taxed away, in turn leading to higher corporate 
taxation. This paper incorporates increasing returns directly into the standard tax competition 
modeling framework to identify the origin of this disparity of results. The model illustrates that 
increasing returns reduce traditional tax competition pressures as capital mobility increases, and 
that changes in preferences for the public good, combined with increasing cross-border 
ownership of capital, and thus tax exporting incentives, are the main factors driving tax rates 
higher. Tax exporting has not previously been linked endogenously to capital mobility in 
standard tax competition models or new economic geography models. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The main result of the standard tax competition literature is that source taxes on mobile capital 
will be competed downward when interregional capital mobility increases – the so-called “race 
to the bottom” result
1. However, capital taxes do not seem to have decreased during the last few 
decades in spite of the surge in capital mobility among advanced industrial nations. Devereux et 
al. (2002) show that while statutory tax rates have been falling, the average tax burden on capital 
did not decrease in the EU and G7 countries over the last few decades. Adding to this is that 
studies estimating correlations between measures of capital mobility and the tax burden on 
capital for OECD country panel data find no support for tax competition
2. Quite the opposite, 
some of these studies have found significantly positive relationships between capital mobility 
and the tax burden on capital. 
 
The explanation of the mismatch between theory and empirics in the field of capital tax 
competition could of course be entirely empirical in nature, due to the significant difficulties 
linked to accurately measuring unobservables such as tax burdens and capital mobility. But the 
source of the mismatch could also be rooted in shortcomings of theory. Several extensions to the 
standard tax competition modeling framework have been proposed as explanations of the 
mismatch between empirical evidence and theoretical predictions, notably political economy 
mechanisms as counteracting forces to the tax competition game3, and tax exporting effects 
stemming from increased international diversification of ownership of economic activity
4. Such 
proposals have more or less smoothly been incorporated into the standard tax competition model, 
                                                  
1 See Wilson (1999) for a review of the standard tax competition literature. 
2 Examples are the results obtained in Quinn (1997), Swank (1998) and Garreth and Mitchell (2001). 
3 See for example Persson and Tabellini (1992). 




and some – notably the tax exporting hypothesis – have been tested and supported empirically
5. 
More recently, the theoretical result of a race-to-the-bottom in tax rates has been challenged from 
an entirely different angle. Rather than extending or modifying the standard tax competition 
model to allow for features of the economy which would counteract a race to the bottom, the new 
economic geography literature takes as a starting point an entirely different theoretical 
framework for analyzing tax competition issues, focusing on the effects of complex 
agglomeration forces on economic integration and taxation. The resulting predictions for tax 
rates depend on the interaction between numerous features of the model, as well as the starting 
point of the interregional allocation of mobile factors are as such less clear-cut and more diverse 
than those of the standard tax competition literature. The particular result in focus here, which 
could be part of the explanation for the empirical lack of tax competition pressures on capital tax 
rates, is that economic integration may lead to a higher degree of concentration of economic 
activity in fewer regions, in turn allowing for the realization of agglomeration rents to capital in 
these regions which are discretely higher than in regions with less economic activity. Due to this 
discrete difference in the return to capital across regions, small changes in the after-tax return to 
capital in high-return regions will not trigger an outflow of capital as long as the return is still 
smaller everywhere else. Capital therefore in a sense becomes a “quasi-fixed” factor in 
agglomerated regions, which – within certain limits – can be taxed without triggering an outflow 
of capital. The possibility of taxation of agglomeration rents may hence result in higher taxation 
of capital when economic integration increases, rather than a race to the bottom.  
 
                                                  
5 Eijffinger and Wagner (2002) test and find the tax exporting hypothesis significant using firm level data for US 
states, but the hypothesis has not been tested as an explanatory factor in panel regressions on macroeconomic data, 




The differences in the assumptions of the standard tax competition model and the new economic 
geography modeling framework makes comparison of the results and attribution of the deviation 
of the results to particular characteristics of the models tricky. To get around this problem, this 
paper shows that the specific results regarding taxation of agglomeration economies and tax 
competition of the new economic geography literature can be obtained in the standard tax 
competition modeling framework by simply incorporating external economies of scale on the 
regional level combined with maintaining the assumption of perfect competition on firm level. 
This allows for accumulation of productive factors in one location to lead to external – or 
agglomeration – economies, which can be taxed without distorting the allocation of capital. 
 
As a bonus in this exercise, including increasing returns and the resulting asymmetric allocation 
of capital in equilibrium in the model allows the modeling of changes in cross border ownership 
of capital, and thus tax exporting incentives, endogenously, as indirectly dependent on the degree 
of capital mobility. The model moreover allows for increasing concentration of economic 
activity and the resulting economies of scale, and higher income in turn leads to changes in the 
preferences for the public good which also affect optimal capital tax rates. These two rather 
intuitive effects of increasing economic integration on taxation have not earlier been included 
endogenously in the tax competition game in the standard tax competition literature, nor have 




                                                  
6 Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) consider the degree of foreign economic ownership exogenously. The lack of tax 
exporting incentives for taxation of capital owned by foreigners in new economic geography models is largely due to 
the specification of government objective functions in this literature, which is generally different from the objective 




The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the setup and central results of the 
two-region version of the standard workhorse tax competition model. Section 3 reviews the 
recent results concerning capital income taxation derived from the new economic geography 
literature, and incorporates these arguments into the framework of the standard two-region tax 
competition model. The final section concludes. 
2.  THE STANDARD MODEL OF TAX COMPETITION 
The basic tax competition model by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) investigates the effects of 
capital mobility on capital income taxation in a simplified framework for an infinity of identical 
regions, and concludes that capital mobility leads to lower tax rates and sub-optimally low levels 
of public good provision. A two-region version of the standard tax competition model is taken as 
a starting point here, in order to simplify the comparison with two-region new economic 
geography models. 
a.  The Model 
Two identical regions, which together form the world or a separate region within the world, each 
have three sectors: production, the household sector and the public sector. There are two inputs in 
production: mobile capital and a fixed factor, which can be thought of as labor. The fixed factor 
is supplied by the households, who hence alternatively can be viewed as owners of a production 
process using only capital, or as providing workers to the production process. Capital enters the 
production process with decreasing marginal productivity: 
( 1)  (),0,0
iii iikkk yfkff =><  
where ki is the amount of capital per head invested in production in region i, i =1,2. The amount 




representative household in region i receives income from invested savings, k, and wage income 
from production. The budget constraint of the representative household is thus: 
( 2)  ()
i iiki xfkfkk r =-￿+￿ 
Where ? is the after-tax return to capital in region i. Since there is no tomorrow, the 
representative household will spend all its current income, hence the equality sign. The utility of 
the representative household depends positively on public spending and private consumption
7: 
( 3)  (,),,0,,0,,0
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The government provides the public good g, which is financed with source taxes t on capital 
employed within the jurisdiction of the region in question. The government budget constraint of 
region i is thus: 
( 4)  iii tkg ￿= 
The government is assumed benevolent and has as strategy to choose the tax rate that maximizes 
the utility of the representative household subject to the government budget constraint. 
b.  Equilibrium under Zero Capital Mobility 
If capital cannot be moved to the other region in response to a tax rate increase at home, taxation 
of capital is non-distortionary. In this case, using the tax rate to increase public spending by one 
unit will cost exactly one unit of lost private consumption. The marginal cost of public funds is 
equal to one. The government will hence increase the tax rate and public good provision as long 
as the marginal utility of the public good is higher than that of private consumption. Under zero 
                                                  
7 The assumption that the utility function is separable in its two arguments simplifies the analysis and makes the 




capital mobility, the strategy of the government in region i will therefore be to choose the tax rate 













c.  Equilibrium under Perfect Capital Mobility 
The total amount of capital available in the world is the sum of capital employed in the two 
regions, and assuming that all savings are invested in production, we have: 
( 6)  12 2 kkk +=  
When capital is perfectly mobile, the representative household can move its capital outside the 
region of residence to attain the after-tax return to capital in the other region if that home net 
return to capital is lower. Only when the net return to capital in the two regions are equal is there 
no incentive to move capital between regions, and under perfect capital mobility, the 
interregional market is therefore characterized by the equilibrium condition: 
( 7) 
12 12 kk ftft -=-  
Given the set of tax rates, the financial market equilibrium is stable and unique due to the 
property of decreasing marginal productivity of capital. This property is essential for the results 
of the standard tax competition model, and exactly what is done away with in the next section 
introducing external economies of scale. An increase in the tax rate in one region initially triggers 
a capital outflow to the other region where the net return is now higher. The outflow will result in 
an increase in the gross return to capital in the tax-increasing region, and a fall in the gross return 
to capital in the other region. The capital outflow will stop when a new equilibrium is reached 
                                                  




according to the financial market equilibrium condition ( 7). Totally differentiating ( 7) with 
respect to the tax rate gives the elasticity of capital employed in region i to region i's  tax rate, and 














How much capital has to flow out of a tax-increasing region to re-gain equilibrium hence depends 
on the second derivative of the production function. 
i k e  is assumed to be smaller than one, which 
ensures that the economy stays on the left side of the laffer curve9.  
 
In the case of perfect capital mobility, an increase in the tax rate will still leave overall tax 
revenues higher and overall private spending lower due to the mechanisms described under the 
zero capital mobility case above. However, under perfect capital mobility, there are three 
additional distortionary effects associated with an increase in the regional tax rate. First, the 
associated outflow of capital lowers the gross return to the fixed factors of production and in turn 
magnifies the reduction in household income due to the tax increase. The second cost is the tax 
base erosion effect: the reduced regional employment of capital leaves less capital to tax, which 
has a negative effect on tax revenues. Third, due to the assumption of a finite number of regions, 
the capital outflow will result in a lower world net return to capital given the other region’s tax 
rate
10. These three effects of a tax increase are not present when capital is immobile because a 
higher tax rate would translate into a one for one reduction in the after-tax return to capital, 
leaving the overall cost of capital as well as the amount of taxable capital unchanged. 
                                                  
9 The assumption ensures that the derivative of tax revenues with respect to the tax rate is always positive. To see 
this, differentiate the budget constraint with respect to the tax rate and rearrange. 
10 The third effect corresponds to the addition of
22 kk f in the denominator of the expression for the elasticity of capital 
to the tax rate, and is a factor mitigating the distortionary effects of capital taxation under perfect capital mobility 





As each unit of tax revenue raised costs one unit of household income plus the sum of the three 
effects described above, an additional unit of spending on the public good costs more than one 
unit of forgone private spending. Now the marginal cost of public funds is greater than one.  
 
The selection of tax rates in the two regions is carried out as a simultaneous move one-shot game 
in tax rates. Once tax rates are selected, capital will flow to equilibrate the net return to capital 
between the two regions according to ( 7). Both governments know how capital responds to tax 
changes, and assuming a Nash game in tax rates between the two regions, the governments’ 
strategy under perfect capital mobility is to set the tax rate which maximizes the utility of the 
representative household, subject to the relevant budget constraints ( 2) and ( 4), the financial 
market equilibrium ( 7), and taking the tax rate of the other region as given. Thus, the first order 























The second term of the numerator depends on whether the region is a capital importer or 
exporter. In the symmetric Nash equilibrium, each region will employ k amount of capital. The 
capital accounts of the two regions will balance and the two income effects will cancel out, 
























 is the marginal cost of public funds, which is always larger than one 
when the elasticity of capital with respect to the tax rate is positive. The government will hence 
select a tax rate which ensures that the marginal cost of increasing public spending by one unit, 
the MCPF, is equal to the marginal utility increase of shifting resources from private spending to 
public spending through a distortionary increase in the tax rate. Since the price of increasing 
public spending in terms of lost private consumption is larger than one, the marginal utility of 
public spending must be larger than the marginal utility of private consumption.  
 
This tax-setting behavior leads to a downward spiral in tax rates when capital becomes mobile, 
referred to as a “race to the bottom” in tax rates. The "bottom" describes the symmetric 
equilibrium level of tax rates on capital. At this "bottom", the cost of decreasing the tax rate in 
terms of lost tax revenue is perfectly balanced with the benefit of the capital inflow that such a 
decrease would entail in both regions. Notice that in this setting, the "bottom" is not a zero tax on 
capital, but a positive although sub-optimally low level of capital taxation. If the two regions 
were to engage in a coordinated marginal increase in the tax rate, this would not affect the 
international allocation of capital, but would reallocate resources from private to public spending 
within each region, thus increasing the utility of the representative household in both regions. 
Moving from an uncoordinated to a coordinated equilibrium would hence be pareto-improving.  
 
To conclude, the prediction of the standard model of tax competition regarding capital taxation is 
hence that regions will increasingly compete for productive capital when capital mobility 
increases, by lowering the tax rates on capital. Capital mobility is hence predicted to be 




3.  INCREASING RETURNS 
The new economic geography literature on tax competition allows for situations where economic 
integration does not lead to a race to the bottom, as described in the introduction. Using economic 
geography models with mobile skilled labor and immobile unskilled labor, Ludema and Wooton 
(2000), followed by Andersson and Forslid (2003) and Baldwin and Krugman (2003), point out 
the possibility of taxation of the mobile labor under the presence of agglomeration rents, without 
triggering an outflow of this factor to other regions. More in line with traditional tax competition 
models, Kind et al. (2003) and Ottaviano and Van Ypersele (2002) assume that the mobile factor 
is capital and allow for the returns to this factor to be spent in the location of the owner rather in 
the location where the factor is employed. They find that when all economic activity is 
agglomerated in one region, the return to capital in that region is higher than the potential return 
to capital in the other region, and this cross-regional difference allows for positive taxation of 
capital in the region hosting the agglomeration without giving an incentive for capital to flow out. 
Additionally, most new economic geography studies find that if production activity is not 
completely clustered in one of the two regions, the governments will use their tax rate to compete 
for capital and will end up with negative tax rates in equilibrium. This result is not qualitatively 
different from standard tax competition models allowing for the lump sum taxation of a second 
production factor
11. New economic geography models hence predict a U-shaped relationship 
between the degree of economic integration and capital tax rates: as regions start to integrate, 
integration initially reduces tax rates through tax competition mechanisms. But as economic 
activity concentrates in one location, responding to and further producing agglomeration 
economies, tax rates are increased again since taxation of agglomeration economies are non-
distortionary within limits.  
                                                  





The concept of economic integration is more complex in new economic geography models 
relative to the standard tax competition model, in which it refers solely to the mobility of capital. 
The degree of economic integration in the new economic geography model is a composite, 
depending on the interaction between the assumed mobility of factors, assumed level of trade 
cost, firm relocation cost etc., and is as such not explicit in the model. For example, while 
holding the relocation cost of real capital fixed, decreasing trade cost will increase the degree of 
economic integration and in turn shift the economy from the downward sloping to the upward 
sloping part of the U-shaped relationship mentioned above. For this reason, as well as due to the 
other many differences between the standard tax competition model and new economic 
geography models, the prediction of the two modeling frameworks are rather difficult to 
compare. This problem is circumvented when external economies are implemented into the 
standard tax competition modeling framework of the previous section, at the cost of a reduction 
in the many nuances of new economic geography models, however. Since the downward sloping 
part of the U-shaped relationship between economic integration and tax rates is already captured 
in a simplified form by the standard tax competition model, this analysis focuses on 
implementing the upward-sloping part in the standard tax competition model  
a.  Allowing for agglomeration forces in the standard tax competition model 
Assume that capital is the only input in production. We thus abstract from returns to fixed factors 
of production. This changes the expression for household income, and the change depends on the 
allocation of capital, and hence on the outcome of the model, as will be discussed further below. 
As a proxy for agglomeration economies, assume increasing returns to capital by assuming a 
positive second derivative of the economy-wide production function. In this way, agglomeration 
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Meanwhile, on the micro level, each firm is assumed to still perceive to be in a perfect 
competition environment
12, and the no-profit condition is assumed to hold for individual firms. A 








where R is the gross return to capital. In all other respects, the framework is the same as in the 
standard model. In particular, it is also assumed here that that the produced good is traded freely 
between the two regions at no cost and, hence, that regional production does not have to equal 
regional consumption. This assumption is implicit in the standard tax competition model where 
equilibria between equally sized regions are symmetric with zero trade, but becomes central in 
the present setup, since trade accounts do not balance (rather, the current account balances) in the 
asymmetric equilibrium as shown below. 
b.  Equilibrium under zero capital mobility 
When capital is assumed immobile, each region will use its own endowment of capital in 
production, and taxation of capital is non-distortionary. The objective of the government is 
identical to that of the standard model in the previous Section: select a tax rate which maximizes 
the utility of the representative household given the relevant budget constraints. Thus, for the 
same reasons as under zero capital mobility in the standard model, capital will be taxed optimally 
according to the first order condition of the closed economy, ( 5). The tax rate will be increased 
as long as the marginal utility of public goods is higher than that of private spending, and vice 
versa, as the marginal cost of public funds is equal to one. 
                                                  
12Since the two regions are identical in terms of factor endowment, it does not matter whether a per capita 




c.  Equilibrium under perfect capital mobility 
Under perfect capital mobility, the external economies version of the model differs in an 
important respect with regard to the standard model: Under the assumption of external economies 
of scale, a capital flow from one region into the other region does not have the equilibrating 
effect of increasing the net return to capital in the region of origin of the capital flow and 
decreasing the net return in the recipient region, as in the standard model. On the contrary, a 
capital flow in response to a net return differential will increase the net return differential and 
create stronger incentive for further capital flows. In this environment, the tax competition game 
unfolds as follows. First, the governments simultaneously choose the tax rate which maximizes 
the utility of their representative households, while taking the tax rate prevailing in the other 
region as given. Second, if there is a net return differential between the two regions, capital will 
flow to the region with the highest relative net of tax return to capital until all capital is 
agglomerated in that region. If there is no net return to capital differential, no capital flows will 
take place. There are two candidates for a Nash equilibrium in tax rates in this setup, depending 
on the starting point of the game. The first candidate for an equilibrium derives from the starting 
point of a core-periphery allocation of capital, in which all capital is invested in one region while 
the other region is living of the repatriated earnings from capital invested abroad. This  
equilibrium is stable, and will henceforth be called the core-periphery equilibrium following the 
economic geography terminology. If, on the other hand, the game starts in a situation of a 
symmetric allocation of capital, the candidate equilibrium will also be symmetric in the allocation 
of capital. This symmetric outcome is unstable, however, and does not exists as a Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies. The symmetric equilibrium is hence delegated to appendix and not 
considered any further here. 




In the core-periphery starting point of the game, all capital is invested in the production of one 
region - the core - while the other region – the periphery - does not have any production at all. 
The net of tax income of the representative household in both regions derives from returns to 
capital invested in the core, and is given by: 






Where c and p subscripts stand for core and periphery respectively. Tax revenues and the 
government budget constraint in the core are given by: 
( 14)  2 cc gtk =￿￿  
While tax revenues and government spending in the periphery are zero: 
( 15)  0 p g =  
The representative household of the periphery spends its net repatriated earnings from capital on 
imports of the private good, while there is no public good provision since there is no tax base in 
the periphery. In this setup, the region hosting the core is able to levy positive taxes on capital 
without risking to lose the core to the other region, since the difference between the gross return 
to capital in the core and the potential gross return to capital of the periphery is strictly positive. 
As long as the tax rate does not exceed this difference, the net return to capital will stay greater in 
the core. Assuming that the periphery sets a zero tax rate
13, the upper limit to the tax rate in the 








=  according to L'Hôpital's rule.):  
                                                  
13 The tax rate in the periphery does in fact not apply to any capital, since it is all invested in the core, and the tax rate 
in the periphery is hence not determinable in the model. Assuming a zero tax rate could be backed by the story that 
the periphery knows that the lower the tax rate in the periphery, the lower the upward bound on the tax rate in the 
core, as shown below in condition ( 16). Hence, a lower tax rate in the periphery would serve to reduce the scope for 
















trig is always positive since the average product of capital always exceeds the initial marginal 
product of capital when the first and second derivatives of the production function are positive. If 
the capital tax rate in the core is set above ttrig, the potential net return to capital will be higher in 
the periphery and this will trigger a capital outflow from the core. Moreover, the process will be 
irreversible; all capital will instantly flow to the periphery and only if the periphery (which is 
now hosting the core) sets a tax rate above the t
trig limit will the former host of the core regain the 
core. Below t
trig, however, capital is effectively immobile, and can be taxed as if lump sum. The 
government of the core hence chooses the tax rate that maximizes the utility of the representative 
household in the core, given the budget constraints ( 13) and ( 14), and a zero tax rate in the 
periphery, and assuming that capital is immobile within the limit given by ttrig. The resulting first 










Note that given an internal solution to the government’s optimization problem, the core-periphery 
equilibrium is stable in that a small outflow of capital or a marginal increase in the tax rate in the 
core would not trigger further capital outflows leading to a move away from this equilibrium. 
Note also that if the government could transfer resources from the public to the private sector 
without changing the tax paid by foreigners, this would increase the utility of the representative 
household. Opposite to the result of under-provision of the public good in the standard model, the 
core-periphery equilibrium is hence characterized by over-provision of the public good. 




It is now possible to identify the factors which drive the utility maximizing tax rate under the 
assumption of increasing returns. While tax competition pressures are absent in this model when 
the solution to the first order condition is internal, there are two other factors affecting capital 
taxation when moving from the zero capital mobility equilibrium to the perfect capital mobility 
core-periphery equilibrium: the income effect concerns the left hand side of the first order 
condition above, and the tax exporting effect concerns the right hand side. Starting with the 
income effect, since all capital is concentrated in the core when capital mobility is perfect, global 
production increases due to the external economies realized by this concentration of production. 
The revenues from this global production are equally split between core and periphery 
households, which both have higher gross income from capital. How much higher is determined 
by the degree of external economies of scale. Depending on the parameters of the household 
utility function, higher income may affect the choice of tax rate through changes in relative 
preferences for the public good. If the preferences represented by the utility function conform 
with Wagner’s Law, the public good should be viewed as a luxury good and the demand for the 
public good should increase relative to private goods as income increases. In this case, the 
income effect should have a positive effect on capital taxation. But the effect could also be 
neutral (as in the example below) or even negative. Second, the right hand side of ( 17) shows 
that the marginal cost of public funds is perceived by the government to be one half. For every 
unit of tax revenues raised, only half of that unit comes from a decrease in household 
consumption. The other half is paid by the foreign capital owner, which entails that the marginal 
cost of public funds is below unity from the viewpoint of the policy maker in the core, who does 
not care about the household in the periphery. Hence, there is a tax exporting effect resembling 
that analyzed in standard tax competition models such as Huizinga and Nielsen (1997), which 




of foreign ownership of capital is set exogenously, and is hence independent of the degree of 
capital mobility. The present setup thus takes a step further in allowing for tax exporting as a 
countervailing force to tax competition, in that the tax exporting effect is endogenous and linked 
with the degree of capital mobility. 
 
Whether or not capital taxes are increasing in the degree of capital mobility hence depends on 
how strong tax exporting incentives are, and what happens to the households’ preferences for  
provision of the public good relative to private consumption, rather than the increasing returns 
per se. Increasing returns in themselves do not explain why the tax rate is higher, only why it is 
not competed downward. The net effect of the two factors listed above depend on the parameters 
of the model. It is therefore not possible to a priori identify whether the utility maximizing tax 
rate is higher in the core periphery equilibrium compared to the tax rate in the no capital mobility 
situation. The assumption of  a homothetic utility function would be sufficient to ensure that tax 
exporting would lead to a higher tax rate under perfect capital mobility though. To form an idea 
of the impact of capital mobility on capital taxes in the external economies of scale version of the 
standard tax competition model, a simple example with functional forms is given.  
 
An example with functional forms 
Suppose that production is characterized by a quadratic production technology and that the 
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where w is a positive weight attached to public spending. Note that the income effect is neutral in 
this example, since the chosen form of the utility function implies that the optimal relative 
allocation of resources between private and public spending is independent of the level of 
income. The tax exporting effect remains.  
 




ncmncm xktk =-￿  
( 21)  ncmncm gtk =￿  
where the ncm subscripts denote the no capital mobility case. Differentiating utility, ( 19), with 
respect to income and public good provision, and using the budget constraints, ( 20) and ( 21), 
and the first order condition under zero capital mobility, ( 5), the equilibrium capital tax rate in 










Turning now to the case of perfect capital mobility and the core-periphery case, private net 
income is the same in both locations when all capital is agglomerated in the core. Moreover, 
government revenues are zero in the periphery as shown above while positive in the core: 
( 23) 
2
cpc xxktk ==-￿ 
( 24)  2 cc gtk =￿  
( 25)  0 p g =  




( 26) is just a reminder that the tax rate is assumed zero in the periphery. Given an internal 
solution to the utility maximization problem, the optimal tax rate in the core is found using the 










trig tk = is higher than the tax rate given by ( 27), the solution is indeed internal
14. Thus, in 
this example of log linear utility and quadratic production, the tax exporting effect makes the tax 
rate on capital double in the core compared to the situation of zero capital mobility. The capital 
tax rate falls to zero in the periphery (per assumption), but this tax rate is of no importance to the 
tax burden on capital since all capital is taxed in the core. Thus, in the present modeling setup, a 
shift from zero to perfect capital mobility is associated with a doubling of the overall tax burden 
on capital. What happens is that increasing returns create agglomeration rents which allow 
taxation of capital without distorting the allocation of capital, and the inflow of capital from the 
periphery creates tax exporting incentives to set a higher tax rate than is the case when capital is 
not mobile.  
4.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has incorporated a central feature of the new economic geography literature regarding 
tax competition – namely that economic integration leads to agglomeration rents to capital which 
can be taxed non-distortionarily – into a simple standard tax competition model. Several insights 
emerge from this exercise. 
 
To begin with, the result of a positive relationship between tax rates and the degree of capital 
mobility in the presence of increasing returns can be obtained from within the standard tax 
                                                  




competition literature, using a simple two-region one-period standard model of tax competition 
with only a few but important modifications. 
 
Moreover, the exercise allows an attribution of the different results of the two literatures to 
specific assumptions of the model. First of all, increasing returns cut the link between economic 
integration and distortionary effects of capital taxation by producing taxable agglomeration rents 
to capital, hence nullifying tax competition pressures, but does not drive the increase in tax rates 
per se. Instead, whether capital taxes will be higher under perfect capital mobility than under zero 
capital mobility depends on tax exporting incentives and household preferences for public good 
provision, which both change as capital flows into the agglomerated region and income increases. 
Tax exporting as an incentive for taxation is absent in the new economic geography literature on 
tax competition (and would be an interesting area of extension). Moreover, the degree of foreign 
ownership of capital, and thus capital tax exporting effects, have not previously been 
incorporated endogenously into the standard tax competition modeling framework. 
 
The predictions emerging from this modified standard tax competition model furthermore match 
previous empirical evidence, that the capital tax burden has not increased in most OECD regions 
in the recent decades, that there is no statistically significant negative link between capital 
mobility and capital taxation to be found, but that there is support for tax exporting effects to 
have a positive effect on capital tax burdens. 
 
The findings imply that the answer as to whether or not capital tax competition is intensifying 
due to regional or global economic integration, with adverse consequences for tax revenues and 




which capital taxes are levied at the source. Where there is a prevalence of increasing returns, tax 
policy may increasingly be seen to be shaped by tax exporting incentives as capital flows into 
centers of economic activity, as well by changes in the preferences for public good provision as 
income levels rise, rather than tax competition forces. 
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5.  APPENDIX 
Initial symmetric allocation of capital and tax competition 
Consider the game described in Section 3 when it sets off in a starting point with a symmetric 
allocation of capital. Given an initial symmetric allocation of capital between the two regions, the 
government’s problems looks as follows: 




































Since the distribution of capital is now “lumpy”, the expressions for the private and government 
budget constraints depend on the allocation of capital, which in turn depends on the tax rates 
chosen by the two regions. If region i sets a lower tax rate than region j, region i will win the 
core, i.e. attract all the capital to region i (case b in ( 28)). The opposite holds true if region i sets 
a higher tax rate than region j (case c). If the two regions choose the same tax rate, the outcome 
will be a symmetric allocation of capital (case a in ( 28)). A possible Nash equilibrium must be 
symmetric in tax rates and in the allocation of capital, since the two regions are identical and 
hence will choose the same tax rate. Consider first whether a symmetric set of strictly positive tax 
rates could constitute a Nash equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that there is 
no utility gain to be had in any of the two regions from marginally lowering the tax rate and 
thereby attracting all capital to the region
15. The gain from marginally reducing the tax rate and 
attracting the core derive from two sources: First, from realizing higher private income through 
external economies taxed at a lower rate, and second, from the doubling of the tax base given the 
tax rate (marginal effect on tax revenues). The cost of a tax cut stem from the reduction in tax 
revenues from infra-marginal units of capital due to the marginally lower tax rate - the infra-
marginal effect on tax revenues. Now, note that in a starting point of strictly positive symmetric 
tax rates, it is always possible to marginally lower the tax rate by less than one half, implying that 
the infra-marginal effect can always be contained to less than one half of the overall tax revenues. 
Since attracting the core entails a doubling of the tax base, this means that it is always possible to 
increase the overall tax revenues through a tax cut, irrespective of the initial level of the 
symmetric set of tax rates. Since private net income is always increased through a tax cut, this 
implies that a tax cut can always be chosen such that it will improve welfare, in turn implying 
that a set of symmetric and strictly positive tax rates cannot be a Nash equilibrium. This leaves 
                                                  
15 This automatically implies that there is no utility gain to be had from marginally increasing the tax rate and thereby 




the situation of zero tax rates, in which it is not possible to cut taxes any further. But given a zero 
tax rate in the other region and symmetry, it will always be beneficial to increase the tax rate and 
thereby chasing the core to the other region, in turn increasing private net income through the 
realization of external economies of scale. So the symmetric zero-tax situation is not a Nash 
equilibrium either. In consequence, a symmetric Nash equilibrium does not exist when the 
starting point is a symmetric allocation of capital. Finally, note that there may be an equilibrium 
in mixed strategies, which is not pursued any further here. 